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11. Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations, "Responsibility while Protecting," p. 3.
12. *New York Times*, September 13, 2011, cited in Spektor (2012).
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CHAPTER 6

Brazil's Ambivalent Challenge to Global Environmental Norms

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Brazil's relationship to global environmental governance has long been fraught with contradictions. The nation is bounteous in biodiversity, forest, and freshwater resources, and it is a global leader in creating new conservation areas. Since 1992, when it hosted the Rio Earth Summit, Brazil has been a negotiation leader of the Global South on environmental issues. Yet at the same time, Brazil's position on environmental issues since the early 1990s has included the adoption of non-committal positions on climate change, increases in its energy production goals to keep up with demand, and the dilution of its forestry laws (Hochstetler and Keck, 2007; Teixeira, 2010).

How does Brazil interact with the evolving global liberal order on environmental issues? This chapter argues that Brazil generally adheres to the global liberal environmental order. Yet this is largely a reflection of the tenuousness and lack of rigor in the global liberal order's approach to environmental issues, rather than an affirmation of any outstanding proactivity in Brazilian environmental leadership. At home, Brazil's often contradictory stances can be ascribed to the low priority given to environmental issues and a lack of domestic consensus on environmental objectives. Other issues, most notably development and national sovereignty, have frequently been given priority over environmental policy, even as non-state actors have effectively influenced local and state environmental policies. The result is a tapestry of differing local, state, and national approaches to the environment. On the world stage, Brazil holds an ambivalent national position with regard to the "green economy," the notion, promoted by the United Nations (UN) since the economic crisis of 2008, of an economy that is low-carbon, efficient in the use of natural resources, and socially inclusive.

This chapter provides a brief history of these contradictions, and specifically examines the influence that non-state actors have exerted over Brazilian environmental politics. The argument proceeds in three parts. The first section describes liberal environmentalism, the predominant approach to global governance on environmental issues. Second, the chapter explains why Brazil's positioning on the green economy incorporates important points of resistance to global liberal environmentalism. The analysis is based on examination of different political actors and multilevel governance. Third, a focused empirical discussion follows, illustrating how changing spheres of influence have affected Brazilian environmental norms, yielding positions which are sometimes contradictory, and which may backslide from earlier positions because of their selective prioritization. The chapter concludes with observations on the interactions between different actors in Brazilian environmental governance and emphasizes the extent to which Brazil's role in global environmental governance is reflective of the norms of liberal environmentalism.

Liberal Environmental Norms: From Sustainable Development toward the Green Economy

Since the late 1980s liberal norms in global environmental politics have centered upon the concept of "sustainable development." The creation of a global liberal environmental consensus—first around sustainable development and, more recently, around the "green economy"—is one of the most important developments in the history of environmental governance, and is marked by the promotion of a liberal economic and political order within the shared goals and values that underpin environmental politics (Bernstein, 2000, pp. 464–512; 2002, pp. 1–16).

For scholars of global environmental governance, it is widely recognized that the norms established within the paradigm of sustainable development are predicated on liberal norms, understood as a championing of free trade principles, environmental cost accounting, and individualization of responsibility (Hobson, 2013, pp. 56–72). With the distinct affirmation of the sustainable development concept that took place at the Rio Earth summit in 1992, environmental governance began to more thoroughly embed the logic of state sovereignty and free market control. Notably, this was achieved through affirmation of the "polluter pays" principle (wherein environmental costs are assumed to be fully accounted for and responsibility is taken by private parties, rather than by strict regulation) and the "precautionary principle" (which establishes that in conditions where there is uncertain environmental harm, precaution should be taken) (Bernstein, 2002). At the summit, trade

and the environment became institutionally viewed as having mutually reconcilable goals, captured within the discourse of sustainable development. The policies stemming from the Rio 1992 Earth Summit emphasized reducing state subsidies, resisting and reducing protectionism, internalizing environmental costs, and clarifying intellectual and other property rights (Bernstein, 2002). At the conference, Brazil largely transitioned from its historic "veto-state" attitude into a position as a more active participant, leading the bloc of nations from the Global South to ensure that environmental agreements would not compromise social priorities of development, poverty eradication, and technology transfers (Barros-Platiau, 2010).

While national strategies for sustainable development emerged and international cooperation followed from the Rio 1992 conference, many governments, including Brazil's, remain plagued by ongoing concerns over global economic, energy, food, and financial insecurity. These are further intensified by scientists' warnings about climate change and civilization surpassing multiple ecological limits. These are multiple and diffuse threats which beckon for international cooperation, suggesting a need for international engagement distinct from that of Cold-War era liberalism, dominated by the United States and Western European countries. However, the framework for international collaboration on those issues remains within the same institutions established in the earlier era of the global liberal order (Ikenberry, 2010).

The "green growth" and "green development" policy discourses—understood to refer to the UN's promotion of an economy that is low-carbon, efficient in the use of natural resources, and socially inclusive—are largely embedded within the sustainable development discourse, and represent a transforming, albeit still entrenched, variety of a global liberal regime. Like sustainable development, the "green" discourses are polemical among the environmental community, and are often criticized for overuse to the point of meaninglessness, as well as a lack of definitional precision in the first place. Sparked by the 2008 financial failures and economic crises, the green economy emerged as an alternative discourse to the sustainable development paradigm which earlier shaped much of global environmental politics (Brand, 2012, pp. 28–32; UNEP, 2011). It came into international prominence as the orienting framework for discussions at the Rio+20 Summit, which took place in Rio de Janeiro in June 2012. The discourse aimed to re-energize national policies, international cooperation, and sustainable development efforts (UN-DESA, 2012).

The green economy discourse posits a worldview wherein economic development is not seen in conflict with environmental priorities or social equity. Instead, these goals are construed as mutually supportive aims. Green

development has been heralded as a means of achieving sustainable development, and as having significant analytical reach and policy applicability (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011, pp. 1157–1159; UNEP, 2011). However, the framework positions the imperative of ecological sustainability predominantly through the lens of economic considerations (Ocampo, 2012; Rocky Mountain Institute, 1998). While the green economy centers upon the concept that economic growth and environmental sustainability have greater synergies than contradictions, critics have argued that in practice, the green economy has involved changing political actors and spheres of influence, encouraging more marketization, privatization, and the fostering of unequal social relations (Jacobi and Sinisgalli, 2012). The discourse of the green economy highlights environmental protection and innovation, but at the same time, may lead to a process in which nature is increasingly seen as a commodity, and where growth imperatives are left unquestioned (Becker, 2012, pp. 783–790). Brazil's role was central in drafting the final conference document, and in arguing for new funds for climate change and avoiding deforestation, as well as in encouraging the Sustainable Development Goals to be emphatic on social inclusion. Brazil's role in recent international environmental governance has been termed that of a "model exporter" (Barros-Platiau, 2010, p. 76), but the conference itself was considered to be a disappointment, especially given that the final document, "The Future We Want," lacked both ambition and detail in its response to continuing environmental degradation and worsening poverty and inequality (Watts and Ford, 2012). The green economy framework captures the notion of a transforming global liberal order, insofar as it is one where market-based principles predominate, and also, as Ikenberry (2010) suggests, the rising powers increasingly take on roles in international cooperation, and "poles" of state influence are more predominant than a central "anchor" of hegemony.

Global institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which operate under liberal environmental norms have had enormous difficulty in coping with environmental challenges (Bernstein, 2002, pp. 1–16). In the forestry sector, for example, the important role ascribed to the private sector has contributed to the difficulty of reaching common global accords on deforestation and forest management issues (Humphreys, 2006). Similarly, the ability of global environmental institutions such as the Kyoto Protocol of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) to cope with the environmental externalities of private sector production has proven woefully inadequate, particularly in the face of climate change (Florini and Sovacool, 2011, pp. 57–74). Such failures highlight the importance of understanding how governments, civil society, and the private sector are responding to and

experiencing the challenges of governance. They also raise questions about the effectiveness of the emerging powers to influence change and the norms that are established within the liberal environmental regimes which were previously dominated by developed countries.

Brazil's Contradictory Global Environmental Politics

Brazil has long been a central player in global environmental politics. Not only has the nation played host to some of the most notable conferences on environment, it is also a leader among nations of the Global South and Latin America within many such discussions. Furthermore, the nation's position on many global environmental issues has been one that seeks to take on responsibility within existing institutions. Its most notable roles as host were at the UN Summit on Sustainable Development (also known as the "Rio Summit") in 1992, and the Rio+20 Summit in 2012. Brazil's important place in global environmental governance is largely *sui generis* because of its wealth of natural resources: its biodiversity and wealth of Amazonian forest and freshwater resources give the nation global relevance on environmental issues. Brazil is generally considered an emerging or middle power in international relations. But in the environmental arena, Brazil is a central player, important historically, symbolically, and materially for its abundance of natural resources. With its increased prominence on the global stage during the twenty-first century, Brazil has increasingly sought to play a more prominent role in governance over environmental issues, most notably in climate change security and in food and agriculture (Barros-Platiau, 2010).[1]

Brazil has generally resisted the status quo in environmental agreements, which, in a general sense, has involved taking little action on most global environmental policy issues. Despite seeking a leadership position in negotiations and within global institutions, Brazil has not been radical in its stances on issues like climate change, where the country has acted in line with other developing countries by seeking common but differentiated responsibilities toward greenhouse gas emissions. Recent environmental dissonances within Brazilian domestic politics demonstrate how the sustainable development and the green economy frameworks are being resisted and re-interpreted in Brazil domestically and internationally, shedding light on the ambivalent ways Brazil interacts with the evolving liberal environmental order.

Brazilian energy and environmental policies have long prioritized development goals, often with an orientation toward modernization, which involves building significant infrastructure and promoting industrial growth. The political path of President Dilma Rousseff is emblematic of this national orientation. Prior to ascending to the presidency, Rousseff served as the head

of the Ministry of Mines and Energy for Brazil. In this capacity, in 2004, she successfully won an international agreement that large dams should be considered as a clean energy source within the World Renewable Energy Conference. Wary of new energy technologies because they seemed to be pushed by the developed countries onto the developing countries, Rousseff took a stance at the 2009 Copenhagen conference on climate change about how the "right to develop" should not be impinged upon by tighter environmental strictures (Faleiros, 2011). Brazil has made strong commitments to promote national economic growth and increase the amount of energy available in the nation by 50 percent. As part of this strategy, the Rousseff government projects that over thirty new dams will be constructed from now until 2021, most of which will be located in the Amazon basin (Forero, 2013).

Despite this decidedly promodernization stance, between 2005 and 2010 there were several signs that the Brazilian government was making progress on climate change. The basis for these changes were substantial reductions in deforestation rates, the signing of a voluntary commitment to reduce emissions in 2009, and the sanctioning of a Brazilian climate bill (Law no. 12,187) in early 2010 (Viola et al., 2012). President Rousseff noted in her January 1, 2011 inaugural speech that the idea of the green economy would be central to her approach: "I consider that Brazil has a sacred mission to show the world that it is possible for a country to grow rapidly without destroying the environment."[2]

Early on in her administration, however, the nation also experienced some notable backsliding on environmental grounds. This concise synopsis captures the recent changes:

> the climate and environmental agenda has suffered considerable setbacks, like the expansion of the oil sector, the reform of Brazilian Forest Code, increase in gasoline consumption, the stagnation of ethanol, and the persistent expansion of individual/private transport. Policies at the federal level have abandoned the focus on issues of low carbon, in particular, and environmental, in general: not only has the implementation of the Climate Law barely advanced, but, in early 2012, the government also responded to the international crisis with a traditional carbon-intensive industrial stimulus package, focused on the car manufacturing sector and decided to eliminate taxation on oil consumption on the same day as Rio+20 ended, in June 2012. (Viola et al., 2012, p. 26)

Historian Andrew Hurrell notes that Brazil is currently faced with the predicament of putting more stock in existing formal institutions (such as the UN Security Council) than other emerging powers. But he also notes that since the Lula administration, domestic politics and informal institutions

have become more politicized, reflecting a broader set of changes, which, he predicts, will erode the rather closed and top-down structures which comprised Brazilian foreign policy in the past (Hurrell, 2010, pp. 60–67). This phenomenon is particularly evident in the environmental arena.

The discussion which follows focuses on some of the most significant environmental norms in the nation through an analysis not only of presidential actions, but also of the sub-state and transnational activism over the environmental issues at stake. It illustrates the multiplicity of actors wielding power in governance processes, and contributes to an explanation of the persistence of the contradictory positions taken by the Brazilian government on these environmental issues. Underlying Brazil's ambivalence toward the green economy are two central foundations of Brazilian political thought highlighted by Maia and Taylor (Chapter 3, this volume): the primacy that the Brazilian government accords to economic development and the primacy of national sovereignty as an underpinning of Brazil's international engagements.

New People and Spaces of Environmental Governance

The field of international relations has long focused on central questions of agency and structure within the international system (Wendt, 1999; Wight, 2006). Some observers of international relations have noted the shifts in global power structures, such that East–West divergences and formal institutions are less relevant than they used to be in actually influencing change (Nye, 2011). Diplomatic norms and state practices are increasingly being questioned. At issue are not only the merits of hard versus soft power, but also who emerges as a relevant actor in international politics and what spaces exist for political action to take place (McConnell et al., 2012, pp. 804–814; Parmer and Cox, 2010; Sharp, 2009; Yeh, 2012, pp. 408–418). A recent focus of scholarship is on the contributions of political geography in approaching these same questions in terms of scale and spheres of action, with emphasis on how a wide range of actors and the extent of their actions influence both the locations and processes of global politics (Bulkeley, 2005; Meadowcroft, 2002; Sjoberg, 2008).

The concept of governance used here is based on understanding a variety of actors and their interactions. It focuses on their interdependence, shared objectives, and fluid frontiers between the public, private, and associated spheres of action, intervention, and control (Kooiman, 1993; Grandgirard, 2007). The borderlines between the public and private are increasingly diffuse in today's globalized world. "Domestically as well as internationally, private actors become politicized and public actors become marketized—'the public

goes private and the private goes public'" (Bexell and Wirth, 2010, p. 218; Jonsson, 2013, p. 1). Informal groups of countries such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are a part of this group of "atypical" actors in international relations, as are the private sector and civil society organizations.

Global environmental governance scholarship has long recognized the importance of domestic politics in influencing environmental outcomes at the global level. State dominance in affecting environmental norms has been significantly challenged, both by globalization politics and by global climate change realities (Barros-Platiau, 2010, p. 78). Civil society and epistemic communities have played central roles in engaging international processes for much of the past generation (Wapner, 1996). As Barros-Platiau noted:

> environmental politics is not ruled by hegemonic fixed structures or balance of power structures. Different actors have been playing unexpected important roles, from the private sector, like the supermarkets that banned GM food; from carmakers producing more efficient cars; from politicians, scientists, singers, movie stars, religious leaders, indigenous leaders, NGOs and so on. (2010, p. 86)

Urban networks and municipal leadership are increasingly important actors in governance in the wake of the failures of multinational accords on climate change (Bulkeley and Moser, 2007; Kern and Bulkeley, 2009; Lee, 2013; Toly, 2008). In the face of government failures to respond meaningfully to the challenges of global climate change and the associated problems of mobility and urban infrastructure, scholars have begun looking to cities as sites of more active responses to such challenges. As several scholars have suggested, the international norms that are adopted are not shaped purely in the international or transnational context; domestic factors play an influential role in determining what international norms are adopted and also the speed at which they come to be embraced (Schreurs and Economy, 1997; VanDeveer and Dabelko, 2001; Weiss and Jacobson, 1998). This is an important avenue for research, not least because of the commonly held view that global cities are especially destructive, as their inhabitants reach out into global markets for energy, consumable goods, and other inputs necessary for survival (Luke, 2003; Toly, 2011). A re-imagining of urban areas as more ecologically sustainable places is already taking place (Register, 2006), as cities are taking the lead in responding politically and with clear normative positions regarding global climate change, thereby urbanizing global environmental governance.

The concept of "paradiplomacy" is especially useful toward understanding the role that sub-national entities such as municipal governments and city

leaders play as political actors (Milani and Ribeiro, 2011; Salomon, 2011). A broad analytic concept, paradiplomacy entails: "subnational governments' involvement in international relations through the establishment of formal and informal ties, be they permanent or ad hoc, with foreign public or private entities, with the objective of promoting social, economic, cultural or political dimensions of development" (Cornago, 2010, p. 13).[3] Some thirty medium and large size Brazilian cities and nearly all Brazilian states participate in paradiplomatic activities in substantive ways (Salomon, 2011). In spite of a handful of case studies examining urban contributions to global climate change regimes (Aall et al., 2007; Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Granberg and Elander, 2007; Holgate, 2007), little scholarship exists about the mutually constitutive relationships of influence that are formed between cities, civil society, and the private sector, as they function to influence governance in the global liberal order.

Brazilian cities' roles in engaging as paradiplomatic actors in global environmental governance have been notable. The state of Pará, which is ranked worst in Brazil for its deforestation rates, created a Green Cities Program (*Programa Municípios Verdes*) in 2011, aimed at curbing deforestation through establishing administrative limitations in all illegally deforested areas. The program that is in place in 97 of Pará's 144 municipalities functions to make a previously inexistent link between local policies of land regularization and the issuing of permits for logging concessions. While the program's effectiveness is not yet measurable, it does offer hope of a new strategy to prevent illegal deforestation, which is an issue of global concern and one where Brazil is especially scrutinized in global environmental politics (Rabello, 2013). In the southern state of Paraná, Curitiba's demonstrated effectiveness of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems made it a leading city in ecological design, and the transit model was emulated in other global cities such as Seoul, Tokyo, and Bogotá.

São Paulo and many other Brazilian cities participate in the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives' Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) program, the International Solar Cities Initiative (ISCI), and, most recently, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, exemplifying their commitment to global environmental governance and to instituting environmental change at local levels (Toly, 2011). Amazonas passed a State Climate Change Policy into law in June 2007, well before the Conference of the Parties (COP-15) climate change conference in Copenhagen. The Acre state government extensively consulted civil society and businesses, prior to creating a sub-national regulatory framework for climate change policy, which included incentives for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and payments for ecosystem services (Shankland and Hasenclever, 2011). Rio de Janeiro's involvement in global events, such as

hosting the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the 2010 UN-Habitat World Urban Forum, and the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) are illustrative of the ways in which city leadership developed and strengthened global ties in the environmental policy arena.

While these efforts may be largely attributed to the roles of mayors and other city sub-national administrators as significant new actors in international relations, it is important to also extend the analysis beyond the sphere of elected officials and into civil society, so as to better understand the ways in which the geographical and political actors of international relations are affecting environmental norms. Scholarship has also long acknowledged the importance of civil society, epistemic communities, and transnational advocacy networks in driving global political change on environmental issues as well as a host of other concerns. It is also worth noting that identities and mutually constitutive processes of governmentality also influence the national and international context of environmental governance. That is, governmental control over the environment extends into decentered, self-regulating networks of knowledge/power relationships at individual levels (Agrawal, 2005; Hecht, 2011b). More directly, the business investment climate of China may influence Brazil's environmental policies and play an important role in shaping the liberal order more broadly. China is Brazil's main trading partner, having surpassed the United States in 2009, and Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) was at a staggeringly high level of USD 13.69 billion invested in 2010 (Freitas, 2014). This brief observation conforms to Ikenberry's assertion that US hegemony is waning, while the role of China is one of the most significant features of the changing liberal order, even as other rising powers like Brazil also increase in prominence (Ikenberry, 2011b). Considering these different levels of actors and influences holds importance for our understanding of how global governance works, beyond the explanations offered both by international regimes theory and scholarship on transnational advocacy networks (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006).

The ability of civil society to politically address national and international issues through activism and protest is also important in shifting norm structures. Susanna Hecht notes that in Amazonia, "environmentalities" of Amazonians' own movements (below the national government, what Hecht calls the "Amazon Nation") have had positive effects since 2004 in spurring reductions of deforestation and achieving new territorial protections for indigenous reserves and conservation areas. These have created and transformed regional political and social landscapes, such that tribal groups and organized civil society groups function to play the roles of vigilance over lands and proactive advocacy for land demarcation. Only a few decades ago this land demarcation was the sole obligation of the state (which often was unable

to exert its authority over the distant lands of the Amazon, resulting in low-level conflicts). Today, in Brazil's post-authoritarian context, challenges to state power come through acts of public protest as well as through official legal challenges brought by the Federal Public Prosecutor's office (*Ministério Público Federal*) (Hecht, 2011b). Many of the nation's still-unresolved indigenous land disputes, such as the encroachment of non-indigenous miners and soy ranchers on Munduruku and Awá lands, are being worked out through a combination of autonomous direct action by the tribes and slow legal proceedings (Parracho and Stauffer, 2014). Thus, we see merits to the observation that governance, understood in the broad sense, is a process of asserting influence over the definition and pursuit of collective goals, based on a multiplicity of interacting actors and arenas of governance.

These manifestations from Amazonian residents are one of many important examples of the pivotal role that exists for sub-state actors in governance, beyond examinations of cities alone as geographic spaces or administrative units. Place-based social movement activism plays an important role in influencing both international relations and national politics. In the Brazilian context, the Congress and the president are ultimately the main actors of relevance in responding to activists' grievances. The effectiveness of such activism ultimately hinges upon the ways in which national-level institutions address their long-standing concerns such as corruption, inequality, fiscal balance, and many other political claims—including environmental policies.

Tensions between Industry and the Environment

Brazil's push for economic growth has largely been based in industrial agriculture for exportation, and also in extractive industries such as mining and fossil fuels. This reliance presents some tension for the Brazilian government's positioning on environmental issues both domestically and internationally, given that ecological concerns (and sometimes human rights questions) are raised when mining, logging, and hydroelectric dams are constructed in fragile ecosystems and sometimes on indigenous lands or inside conservation areas. While the vast majority of the electricity consumed in Brazil comes from renewable sources, which includes more than three-quarters from hydroelectric dams (Blount, 2013), non-renewables (e.g. fossil fuels, natural gas, coal) still outweigh renewable energy production by a few percentage points in the overall Brazilian energy market (EPE, 2013). Many infrastructure projects, including the Belo Monte dam, are being principally funded by the Brazilian National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) (*Reuters*, 2012). The scale of BNDES lending is not to be underestimated; in 2010, its lending volume was around USD 69 billion, a sum nearly three

times greater than the loans of the World Bank (Lazzarini et al., 2011).[4] Within Brazil, infrastructure loans from the BNDES were 25 percent higher in 2012 than in the year prior, a notable indicator of the national commitment to rapid infrastructure development (*Wall Street Journal*, 2012). As such, institutionalizing greater sensitivity on environmental and social issues within the bank is an enormous challenge and one of substantial global importance, given the bank's international portfolio (Marinis, 2010).

Policies for energy concession contracting and natural resource use are germane to environmental governance insofar as they influence the nation's energy production and consumption and also as they relate to the power dynamics through which environmental governance takes shape. Brazil's position at the Convention on Biodiversity negotiations in 2010 supported a 10 percent marine protection target by 2020. However, an estimated 80 percent of Brazilian marine fisheries are overfished, and only 1.5 percent of its exclusive economic zone is protected (Scarano et al., 2012). Current estimates show that nearly 9 percent of the priority areas for fisheries conservation have been sacrificed to offshore oil exploration (*Greenpeace*, 2010). The pre-salt oil reserves discovered off the coast of Brazil will be controlled in large part by the state-owned oil giant Petrobras. The government has stipulated rules that guarantee that it will maintain a 30 percent stake in the concessions and function as the sole operator (*Dow Jones Newswire*, 2013). In this instance, the state's national energy production priorities trump its own environmental commitments, not only in terms of biodiversity but also through the priority given to fossil fuel extraction as the basis for growth.

Brazil's relationship with China and the growing trade relations between the two countries also suggest risks to the environmental safeguards present in existing global environmental governance regimes. The significant trade between Brazil and China has led to extensive collaborations in the oil and mining sectors, and is a centerpiece of Brazil's economic stability. In the past decade and a half, China has become Brazil's major geoeconomic and geopolitical partner—as well as core competitor—in Latin America, and managing the relationship with China is a central concern of Brazilian foreign policy (Vadell, 2013). The magnitude of Chinese investments in Brazilian energy infrastructure alone totaled over USD 18.3 billion between 2005 and 2012 (Husar and Best, 2013), influencing both fossil fuel and renewable energy developments. As the green economy's proposal to create a low-carbon, more inclusive, and resource-efficient future takes hold, Brazil's own government, as well as its private enterprises, will be pressed to institute normative and regulatory frameworks to guarantee that human rights and environmental protections are seriously directed toward those aims even as extractive industries and infrastructure expand their reach.

To illustrate this point, one need only look at the Brazilian mining company Vale SA. Vale operates in thirty-eight countries and is the second-largest mining company in the world. It won the ignoble Public Eye award in 2012 for its poor environmental and human rights record in mining operations in Brazil, Mozambique, and many other locations (Sousa and Hermann, 2013). Regulating Vale's actions on human rights and environmental grounds may well entail substantial confrontations and affect sensitive trade negotiations with China, whose hunger for commodities is well known and not likely to be easily assuaged. Avoiding such confrontations, on the other hand, gives greater credibility to the critiques that have been leveraged against the green economy, namely, that it is a framework which functions to promote the persistence of overconsumptive, unequal, and relatively undemocratic consolidations of control within the global economy, to the detriment of people and the environment.

Deforestation and Climate Change

Brazil's wealth of forests and extraordinary biodiversity make it a key player in global environmental governance. It jointly created the Megadiverse Like-Minded Country Group, which was the leading negotiation bloc at the Convention on Biological Diversity and in the Nagoya Protocol for Genetic Resources and Equitable Sharing of Benefits. Brazil innovated and garnered substantial international funds through the establishment of forest research and protection investment pools such as the Pilot Program to Conserve the Brazilian Rainforest (PPG7) and the Fundo Amazônia. Brazil also participates in regional environmental agreements such as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty (ACT), although these are relatively insignificant in their relation to the global environmental regimes (Barros-Platiau, 2010).

Despite such active participation in agreements aiming to quell the spread of deforestation, Brazil's position in climate change negotiations may be seen as something akin to a race for second place. While deforestation has declined remarkably in Amazonia since 2004 and even more significantly from 2008 to 2009, Brazil has missed an opportunity to become a global leader on climate change (Scarano et al., 2012). Brazil's positions were more ambitious on the issue of emissions reductions than those of India or China, but Brazil is not perceived by some other nations as being progressive on the issue of climate change. A 2009 US cable leaked through Wikileaks states, "The Government of Brazil (GoB) does not consider climate change an immediate threat to Brazil, and is not willing to sacrifice other priorities to address the problem" (King et al., 2012, p. 50).

Confirming this suspicion is the country's resistance to REDD+ financing,[5] which stems from concerns that it will introduce untoward foreign influence in the Amazon and allow other countries and industries to shirk responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions (King et al., 2012). Still, the Brazilian government does support the general institutional framework for addressing climate change established in the Kyoto Protocol, especially through the top-down targets for developed countries and nationally defined targets based on historical emissions rates for developing countries (King et al., 2012).

Former Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made a non-binding voluntary commitment at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP-15) that Brazil would reduce Amazonian deforestation by 80 percent by the year 2020. There is good reason to be skeptical about the feasibility of Lula's promise, however, given that Brazil will likely have several different presidential administrations between now and 2020. Around 50 percent of the Brazilian Amazon lands are protected in conservation areas and indigenous territories, leading to substantial reductions in deforestation rates. And though deforestation declined remarkably in Amazonia between 2004 and 2012, it has ticked up since then. The difficulty of credibly committing to further environmental restrictions suggests that there are good odds that future administrations will simply sidestep their Copenhagen commitments (Fearnside, 2012, p. 78).

Furthering skepticism about Brazil's likely success in combating deforestation, no land was placed into new protected areas, and the government even reduced the size of some already-established protected areas during Dilma Rousseff's first year as president (2011). This was the first time in more than fifteen years that such statistics did not go up (Scarano et al., 2012). A heated political process surrounded the revision of Brazil's Forestry Code in late April 2012, forgiving fines that had been issued for pre-2008 deforestation. The new Code loosely implied, moreover, that amnesty for violators would be encoded into the law through a stipulation that the rules could be reviewed within five years of the law taking effect (Rabello, 2013). Deforestation rates remain largely tied to market signals, although tightened scrutiny over beef exports and the ranching sector have helped to reduce illegal deforestation. With Brazil as the world's leading beef exporter, strict regulation will be key (Hecht, 2011b). Meanwhile, Brazilian indigenous groups, whose territories are recognized as being the strongest bastions of environmental conservation in the country, are continuously under threat from land invasions, unscrupulous carbon credit dealers (Harvey, 2007), and, most recently, proposed constitutional amendments which would roll back indigenous land protections and make demarcations of new lands significantly more difficult (*Amazon Watch*, 2013; Harvey, 2007).

A further example of these conflicting sources of environmental policy, and the federal government's strong but by no means monopolistic influence over Brazil's environmental policy, lies in the recent case of the Belo Monte dam project.

The Belo Monte Hydroelectric Project

The Belo Monte hydroelectric project has a long and complex history involving both government plans and oppositional activism (Bratman, 2014). It is also a high-stakes project of enormous salience to both proponents and opponents: when it is completed, likely in 2016, the Belo Monte dam is slated to be the world's third-most productive hydroelectric dam when operating at full capacity. It serves as an excellent illustration of shifting Brazilian environmental norms because of its symbolic importance, its physical importance in achieving the nation's energy production goals, and the extensive history of transnational, national, and local activism in response to the project.

The policy and planning responses to the Belo Monte hydroelectric project since the late 1990s have involved dynamics of pressure and political engagement from the sub-national and international spheres, alike. An important early fault line developed around norms of public involvement and environmental assessment within the debate over approval of the Belo Monte project. These norms are enshrined through the national environmental policy (*Sistema Nacional de Meio Ambiente*, or SISNAMA), which is stipulated in the Brazilian Constitution (Law No. 6.938, with a basis in Articles 23 and 225 of the constitution). The policy requires strong impact assessment measures as well as public participation. The government also signed on to the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention 169, an agreement that calls for the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples who may be affected by nationally sponsored projects. Only after public involvement processes take place does Brazilian (and international) law allow for preliminary construction and operating licenses to be issued and public bidding processes for work contracts to take place (Baptista and Thorkildsen, 2011). The Belo Monte case history, however, has made these normative commitments appear disingenuous, as the discussion below elaborates.

The first approval of construction of the Belo Monte project was granted by the national Congress in 2004, with virtually no debate. This was prior to any updated consultations or environmental impact assessments, and was later found to be a violation of the National Environmental Policy, Law No. 6.938 (established in 1981). Then, in 2009, the environmental licensing

process was found to have been inadequate by officials from within the national environmental agency. Two heads of Brazil's environmental agency (IBAMA), Roberto Messias Franco and Abelardo Bayma Azevedo, resigned in 2010 and in 2011, respectively, both allegedly over pressures to grant a full environmental license for the construction of the dam (Hurwitz, 2011). Of note, there was also a longer legacy of resignations among the government's environmental leadership. Between May 2008 and 2009, Marina Silva, the former Minister of Environment, resigned from her position, under pressure from agribusiness and energy sectors, which opposed legal barriers to new projects with potential environmental impacts. The presidents of IBAMA (Bazileu Margarido) and the Chico Mendes Institute for the Conservation of Biodiversity (ICMBio; João Paulo Capobianco) also resigned on claims of suffering political pressures running contrary to their own jobs (Novaes and França Souza, 2013).

Public hearings about the dam project made a mockery of the idea of public involvement,[6] since they were clearly being conducted more for tokenistic reasons than to seriously address any objections that might arise and slow the project down. Even before one set of public hearings had been held, the energy ministry announced the date when a preliminary license would be granted, and a 20,000-page Environmental Impact Assessment was released to the public only two days before another hearing (Marques, 2009; Salm, 2009). The close timing was not illegal, however, and it indicates how the Brazilian state has been able to strategically maneuver within existing environmental norms to attain greater flexibility in the regulatory regime. Additionally, IBAMA has increasingly adopted a licensing loophole of sorts, allowing for construction and operation licenses to be granted even though many stipulated social and environmental "pre-conditions" to the license remain unmet.[7] Failure to meet these pre-conditions results in the levying of additional fines but has not stopped this and other projects from moving forward (Borges, 2013). Such loopholes allow the state to achieve its agenda, while simultaneously appearing to uphold an image of democratic procedure and adherence to existing (and often very cumbersome) environmental rules.

The judiciary has been another battlefield in the process. Legal injunctions stopping the construction of the project from moving forward have frequently left the future of the project hanging in the balance. Ultimately, the judiciary has only delayed the project, rather than overturning it entirely. These judicial processes have re-affirmed the contradictions inherent in energy policy. One judge, while overruling an injunction against the dam, argued that Brazil's energy demands were so urgent that if the Belo Monte project was further delayed, other more expensive and polluting energy sources such as

thermoelectric energy would be tapped (Graeff, 2012). Thus, in the name of "green" logic, the position that the dam should proceed triumphed over long-standing concerns about the lack of consultations of affected indigenous peoples or the environmental impacts of the dam itself (Borges, 2013). In addition, the dam's official estimated cost of some USD 13 billion has likely been exceeded, with estimates of the true cost ranging from USD 16 to USD 32 billion, making the project non-viable in financial terms (Rapoza, 2014). An evocative indicator of the state's commitment to the Belo Monte project, even in the face of high-profile attention and civil society pressure, came during the Rio+20 Earth Summit in June 2012, when anti-dam activists interrupted a session with high-level ministers and banking officials present. Environment Minister Izabella Teixeira engaged in a ten-minute shouting match with the protestors (Leitão, 2012; *O Eco*, 2012).

In addition to the protests at the Rio+20 Summit, local actions at the dam site taking place concurrently with the summit included a protest march with local high school students and residents, a few organizers of the Movement of People Affected by Dams (MAB, or Movimento dos Atingidos por Barragems), the NGO Movimento Xingu Vivo organizers, and a Brazilian telenovela actor. At the dam site itself, a protest also took place, which included local tribes and Munduruku indigenous peoples (who came out of concern that Belo Monte was the gateway dam for the Tapajós river dams, slated next for construction, which would affect their own areas), some young foreigners from the Rainbow Family, and an assortment of national and international NGOs, including the Instituto Socioambiental, Amazon Watch, and International Rivers. Later occupations of the dam site included a number of indigenous tribes from the Xingu River basin. While government officials from local municipalities were not present at the protests, their relationship to the project has shifted over time: at first they supported the project, then cautioned against it, as the energy consortium's promises for certain important local benefits remained unmet. As the Belo Monte project has become perceived as inevitable, local activist coalitions have splintered, creating a fragmented set of civil society opposition actors who are increasingly impotent in their efforts (Bratman, 2014).

The fracturing of social movements is a key factor in the state's success in proceeding with the Belo Monte project, but the project is far from minimal in its social and ecological consequences. Over a dozen local tribes of the Xingu River basin will be affected by the project, including the Xinkrin, Kayapó, Asurini, Arara, Araweté, Paracanã, and Juruna. Most of these tribes, as well as the traditional fishing and rubber-tapping populations of river-based peasants living along the Xingu River, will experience significantly lower water levels as a result of the dam, affecting their transportation and

lifestyles. Additionally, over 20,000 urban residents in the city of Altamira, Pará, will be displaced by the flooding from the project. Many of these communities have experienced human rights violations in conjunction with the project.

Claiming violations of the free, prior, and informed consent stipulations that are a part of the ILO's Convention 169 (as well as consultation stipulations in Article 231 of the Brazilian Constitution and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples), many of the indigenous tribes of the Xingu River basin issued a complaint to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), which is part of the Organization of the American States (OAS). In April 2011, the IACHR ruling demanded that Brazil suspend the dam's construction, based on violations of the ILO Convention 169. President Rousseff rejected the decision and retaliated by suspending payment of Brazil's dues (USD 800,000) to the organization and recalling Brazil's OAS ambassador (Soltis, 2011). In this instance, the Brazilian government's position was clear; the national priorities for sovereignty and development trumped its international commitments. In a later ruling, the IACHR modified its position, and noted that "the debate between the parties on prior consultation and informed consent with regard to the Belo Monte project has turned into a discussion on the merits of the matter, which goes beyond the scope of precautionary measures" (IACHR, 2011). Brazil's place in the liberal environmental order, in this instance, might be viewed as one of leadership only when the international order aligns with other national priorities, a position seemingly in conflict with Brazil's simultaneous aspirations to be an international champion of human rights and multilateralism (Sotero, 2012).

The current state of the Belo Monte project and activism against it suggests that pains are being taken by the government to maintain basic compliance with domestic laws and democratic commitments. However, there is a simultaneous unwillingness to yield to changes that would involve more concerted public participation, legal proceedings, impact assessments, and consultation for the Belo Monte project, yielding dissonance between policies and practices. Domestic policy changes and creative legal maneuvering have occurred over the course of the project, enough to shift the character of several important normative structures including indigenous consultations, licensing procedures, and prior environmental impact assessments. Despite attempts by both domestic and transnational civil society to exert pressure on the state, the environmental norms and human rights safeguards at stake in the Belo Monte case have been overcome by the state's imperative to increase energy supply, even if this comes at significant environmental, cultural, and even economic cost.

Brazil's Environmental Ambivalence

In spite of the emergence of new spheres of influence such as cities and the importance of transnational and sub-national activism, Brazil's positions on global environmental norms emphasize the politics of a strong national developmental state. The national state's dominance arises out of its strong regulatory role, commitment to sovereignty, and desire for economic stability. Ultimately, the state gives top priority to economic concerns, but still takes pains to make discursive commitments that recognize environmental governance globally. While still wishing to maintain international favor and legitimacy through its commitments and environmental discourses, Brazil's environmental stances ultimately take a back seat to other concerns, making Brazilian positions in global environmental governance appear disingenuous and frequently contradictory.

This chapter has discussed a wide range of actors and influences upon Brazil's role in the green economy. On the global stage, the green economy represents a deepening of liberal norms and a shifting liberal international order in which Brazil has a notable role. A few observations help to summarize Brazil's interactions with global environmental governance. First, urban areas in Brazil, and the urbanization phenomenon more broadly, are significant factors within global environmental governance. Not only do Brazilian cities function as paradiplomatic actors, but they are also a sphere for public action, catalyzing attention and action on mobility, inequality, and environmental issues at the national and international levels in formative ways. Second, domestic and transnational civil society activism against substantial infrastructure projects such as the Belo Monte dam, has not been effective in terms of its ability to spur normative shifts or reinforce existing environmental and human rights norms. Instead, the Brazilian government has taken on normative stances which demonstrate the limits of its environmental commitments. This brings into high relief the question of whether infrastructure growth, environmental protection, and social inclusion can indeed be triangulated in a balanced way. Moreover, state control over many extractive industries and the privileging of extractive industries and their substantial infrastructure overall within the Brazilian political economy indicate that Brazil's priorities will likely involve a national prioritization of non-renewable resources within the green economy for many years to come. Deforestation rates may be improving and renewable energy remains one of Brazil's most laudable environmental achievements, but even these are not without their costs. Amazonian dams such as the Belo Monte project qualify as renewable energy projects, but entail significant environmental and human rights concerns. Finally, the lack of social and environmental safeguards and

transparency in Brazilian mining, petroleum drilling, and infrastructure investments domestically and internationally remains in conflict with many of the nation's stated international commitments toward environmental protection.

While this discussion has shown that the urban sphere, social movement activism, and private enterprises are taking on important roles in global environmental governance, these observations should not be interpreted to mean that the national state is obsolete. Indeed, far from it, all of the characteristics of Brazil's positioning in global environmental governance are dependent upon the national government's responsiveness and oversight. Infrastructure, energy, and urban policies may be quite strongly influenced by the challenges of activists or the investments of private corporations. However, between the strong national development bank, the Brazilian courts, and the ability of the federal government to pass legislation in rapid response to public outcry, the federal government remains the central actor in Brazilian environmental governance. Brazil's stance toward the liberal environmental order on the global stage is shaped in significant ways by the national government's energy protectionism, prioritization of modernization and economic development, and its emphasis on national sovereignty. Dissonance between policies and practice, both domestically and internationally, are common in Brazil. In spite of its spotty domestic and international track record on mining, climate change, renewable energy, and deforestation, Brazil has continued to confidently champion its environmental achievements, remaining both symbolically and pragmatically a central player within the changing liberal order of the green economy.

Notes

1. Other works on Brazilian environmental policy and its implications for global environmental governance focus on the specific issues of climate change, biodiversity, and low-carbon development policies (Lampreia et al., 2011).
2. Rousseff (2011).
3. See also Duchacek (1990).
4. "Performance: The Evolution of BNDES' Disbursements." 2013. *BNDES* http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_en/Institucional/The_BNDES_in_Numbers/
5. A strategy for addressing REDD, which also includes forest management practices, enhancing existing carbon stocks, and including the role of conservation as a form of payment for avoiding deforestation. For more information, see: http://www.un-redd.org/aboutredd/tabid/102614/default.aspx

6. Interview with author, Biviany Rojas (lawyer, Instituto SocioAmbiental, July 3, 2012).
7. Decreto no. 7.340, October 21, 2010. The Belo Monte case involved over forty social and evironmental conditions within the Preliminary License. When the conditions were not all met on schedule for the installation licensing process, IBAMA set a new precedent and granted an exception in January 2011, allowing that the installation license be approved even though these preliminary conditions had not been met. Lawsuits and appeals from the federal prosecutor's office requesting the suspension of this license have been overruled by the high courts in Brasília. The basis for these rulings is that interfering with the project will harm the public order and the economy. For more, see Graeff (2012).